On Oct. 7, 2023, the Hamas organization launched a series of operations against Israel, apparently catching the Jewish state completely by surprise. This was not the first time that Israel has been surprised. In 1973, Egypt and Syria initially achieved surprise and almost won, but the Israeli forces recovered and nearly annihilated their opponents in a conflict that came perilously close to bringing about World War III. This was a conventional war, in which the attackers could count on superiority in numbers of soldiers and weapons.
Hamas and other irregular forces have to wage war by exploiting weaknesses in the enemy armor, not by direct conventional combat. The United States has learned about this technique, known as asymmetric warfare, the hard way. Precisely because of our overwhelming conventional military forces, our enemies – from the Viet Cong down to Al Qaeda – have developed unconventional alternatives. Think back to 9-11. The USA has overwhelming air superiority; but that did not prevent Osama bin Laden’s men from launching an air attack on our biggest city. It was the first time since 1814 that anyone had launched a successful attack on the continental United States.
Osama’s motives were kind of complicated, and no doubt he had time to contemplate the pluses and minuses of what he did in the years before the Obama administration found him. But why did Hamas attack when they did? Why did they choose to risk most of their combat assets in this operation? Let’s consider some of the alternative reasons why one force or country launches an assault on another. It’s not only important for Israel to figure this out, it’s also necessary for us, as Israel’s most important ally, to understand what’s going on. If you don’t know what’s going on, your odds of winning go down lickety-split.
The first and most traditional reason for an invasion is CONQUEST – whether to seize a slice of territory or an entire country. That clearly explains nothing here because Hamas does not have the forces or military infrastructure to defeat and occupy an entire country. In the long run, Hamas does want to destroy Israel, but that could not be the outcome of this operation.
Then there is MILITARY VICTORY, which sounds like CONQUEST but is not quite the same. Nations have often invaded disputed or hostile territory in order to inflict a defeat, the goal of which is other than pure conquest. American forces did not invade Germany in World War II for the sake of conquest. There are countless situations where invasions have been launched with the goal of obtaining advantages in postwar negotiations. But Hamas could do no more than embarrass the Israeli military; a defeat, in the conventional sense, is beyond its capability.
An invasion can also be launched as a means of ATTRITION or EXHAUSTION, slightly differing strategies which aim not at a decisive victory, but at reducing enemy strength. This is plausible, but only indirectly. Hamas’ forces again are too small and weak to engage in either of the above strategies through offensive operations. However, it is possible that Hamas is hoping to drag Israel into a lengthy and costly ground war in Gaza (Hezbollah might try to make this happen in Lebanon), which would impose human and financial costs on Israel. Of course the cost for the inhabitants of Gaza would be even greater, but this does not appear to concern Hamas.
Military operations are sometimes designed around a strategy of DEMONSTRATING CAPACITY. This can be done for psychological reasons such as intimidation, or simply because the tactical capacity exists. The former motivation would suggest a certain naïveté on the part of Hamas which is unlikely. Intimidating Israel is simply not possible. The latter is possible. First, many military establishments have followed this route. The United States used a high-firepower, air war-based strategy in Vietnam mainly because we could, not because it was designed for the theater. In the case of Hamas, this could reflect the suspected divisions within the organization, namely that the political wing was opposed to this assault, while the military favored it.
However, the most likely strategic goal that Hamas is pursuing is a POLITICAL one, namely, that of DISRUPTING THE PEACE PROCESS. Hamas and Hezbollah have launched assaults before whenever the peace process seemed to be gaining ground. In the last couple of years, more Middle Eastern governments seem to accept the existence of Israel. So how does an attack by Hamas undermine the peace process? First, a war between Israel and its enemies creates great popular excitement of the anti-Israel kind throughout the region, making peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors impossible, at least for the moment. Second, the resulting warfare leads to “civilian” casualties, which undermines Israel’s global image.
There is clearly a political downside to Hamas’ attack. First, this war takes place as ties between the USA and Israel had been weakening. Outside of a few radical elements on both extremes here, support for Israel now appears to be solid. Second, it may generate more unity within an increasingly fractious Israel. Here is where it gets complicated. If the Hamas invasion generates support for the existing Israeli government, or, more likely, for the hard-line elements on the Israeli right, that may do more damage to Israel in the long run than the physical and human cost. The hard line elements are the least likely to compromise, and without compromise, peace is not possible. Israel needs peace, at home as well as at abroad. It has won every war it has fought since its founding 75 years ago. But it only has to lose once.
And its enemies know that.
Hubert van Tuyll is a military historian retired from Augusta University. Reach him at hvantuyl@augusta.edu
