By the time this is published, the Russo-Ukrainian War will be two months old. Like all wars, many expectations have been shattered. As I fessed up in an earlier column, I did not expect Vlad to launch a full-scale invasion. He did not expect the war to last even this long, no doubt anticipating a quick Ukrainian collapse.
Russia’s initial invasion was obviously intended as a shock and awe operation that would cause the Ukrainian government and military to flee their exceedingly vulnerable capital of Kyiv. But Ukraine shows no signs of giving up, and the war does not look anywhere close to a termination. The most important decisions at this moment are those of Ukraine, and the most important one is, what strategy would work best to continue to frustrate the Russians?
Attrition does not seem a likely choice. As this involves trading lives, Ukraine could not sustain it for long. Its population is less than a quarter of Russia’s, and a quarter of its own population has fled. And while attrition seems like a mathematically plausible strategy, it has rarely worked. Surrenders have happened because a country runs out of soldiers, but this happens more often because of the attackers’ ineptitude than because it was a chosen strategy. A famous example in our own hemisphere is the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), in which Paraguay went to war against Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil, all at the same time. (Note to file: never attack all your enemies at once.) Paraguay lost two thirds of its adult male population in the war, which caused its collapse. In World War II, Soviet Russia lost 26 million lives, but it won – and those losses were only tangentially the results of chosen strategy.
Exhaustion is more plausible. Exhaustion is often confused with attrition, but it is quite different. Simply put, exhaustion means to wear down the opponent’s will to wage war. This may be done by inflicting more casualties than the enemy is willing to absorb, seriously damaging its economy, or undermining political support for the war. This has often led to the end of wars. In World War I, it triggered both the Russian exit and later the German surrender. But it does not work if a government or – more commonly – an individual leader is determined to continue the war at all costs. In World War II, neither Nazi Germany nor Imperial Japan surrendered until the bitter end. (Neither did the dictator of Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance.) But Italy did – mainly because the dictator was toppled. Vladimir Putin is difficult to topple. He is very security conscious, and his secret police background no doubt helps him foresee possible dangers. Only an internal coup or assassination, or a mass uprising, could topple him. And he is unbothered by the costs.
Yet this may be the most promising strategy. Russian losses by themselves will not undermine Putin – but if more and more Russians become disenchanted with the reasons for the war, and the more the war costs oligarchs significant money, the more there is a chance of a revolt or action by military leaders to end Putin’s leadership. In a more peaceful way, this is what happened in the United States during the Vietnam War. Communist leader Ho Chi Minh had predicted that, because it had taken eight years to force the French out of Indochina, it would take 10 years to convince America to leave. Although the enemy did make one attempt to win the war through battlefield victory (discussed below), overall Communist leadership recognized that the United States had immense resources and had to be persuaded that the war effort was not worth it. Dissent about both the war and its conduct crippled the Lyndon Johnson administration and led him not to seek reelection.
Could Ukraine take the offense? One of Ukraine’s biggest problems is that the Russia holds the initiative, and that the Russian army can reform and rebuild at its leisure and then invade again. This was a problem that the Confederacy faced in our Civil War and made three completely unsuccessful attempts to resolve. Striking Russia in a conventional sense is not possible, except in one way. Ukraine may consider attacking military depots in regions just inside Russia and Belarus. However, a conventional invasion is not possible. Ukraine cannot possibly capture large swaths of enemy territory and hold them, as its forces have their hands full defending the homeland. More importantly, an invasion of Russia might stiffen Russian popular support for Putin. (This is not guaranteed; in World War I, the reverse actually happened.)
But a far more important possibility concerning offense has to do with WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). Ukraine used to have atomic bombs, but it gave them all to Russia 30 years ago in return for international guarantees of its borders. Could Ukraine threaten Russia by claiming that it possessed some type of WMD and would use it in the end? Would a bluff convince Putin?
Wars are rarely settled by a single battlefield victory but this is something that Ukraine has pulled off on a small scale, and if it succeeds on a larger scale, it might undermine both Russia’s capacity and will to continue. Ukraine has developed new approaches to “operational art,” the aspect of military science that sits between tactics and strategy, relying on small unit operations to swarm and cripple the ponderous Russian forces. This would require Ukraine to cripple Russian intelligence, especially aerial intelligence, and lay a trap with a fake retreat; a method used countless times in warfare. This is plausible, although Russia can continue sending troops to overcome many defeats.
Does Russian history give us any help to consider what might work? To give you a favorite professor’s answer – Yes and No. Every war is different, and trying to refight the last one almost never works. Russia has a proud history of waging difficult wars. However, those famous wars were usually waged against invaders, giving the Russian nation a very clear sense of purpose. Everybody knows what happened to Napoleon and Hitler (and it was the Russians, not the cold weather, that led to their demise).
But the flip side is that this war is the worst Russian military performance since the Crimean War (1853-56). Ironically, in that conflict the Russians had gotten off to a good start and then suffered great humiliation when they could not expel the European armies that landed on the Crimea (still a bone of contention between Russia and Ukraine). This disastrous defeat led to the repetition of a pattern; reform after defeat. Peter the Great reformed the entire country after he was initially defeated by Sweden (yes, Sweden) in the Great Northern War (1700-1721). The Crimean War led Tsar Alexander II to abolish serfdom, the closest thing Russia had to slavery. (Sometimes having an absolute ruler is good; the Russians had no civil war about the issue.)
Then there was World War I, a far greater catastrophe. The people did not understand the war, and the entire war effort and the economy were collapsing by the end of 1916. In early 1917, a massive popular uprising toppled the Russian monarchy, culminating in a second revolution that brought one of Russia’s Communist parties, the Bolsheviks, to power. The first revolutionaries were aided by the historically remarkable incompetence of Tsar Nicholas II, a stupidity that Putin is unlikely to mirror.
Those of you who know your modern history might accuse me of skipping over a couple of other disasters. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) was indeed a disaster, and it culminated in an attempted revolution and major reforms (that pattern again!) but the Russian Army was not defeated nearly as badly as it was in these other conflicts. (Admittedly, the Navy was wiped out.) The Russo-Finnish War (1939-40) was also a disaster, and at first glance seems more like the current conflict; Russia invading a neighbor and running into trouble. But Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was far more careful than Putin. Finland is much tinier than Ukraine. There was no way that anyone would help Finland because Hitler was friendly and the western powers were at war with Hitler. And Stalin did win.
It’s easy being an armchair strategist. There is no penalty for being wrong. The Ukrainians do not have that luxury. Thousands of Ukrainians have died and millions have fled. As the child of parents who experienced Nazi occupation, I feel this acutely. So where does this leave Ukraine? The Russians advanced on urban areas at the beginning, an astounding tactical error that can only be explained by their assuming the defense would be token. In other words, their initial advance was intended to be a parade. Urban environments favor the defense, which the Russians ought to have considered. Can you say, “Stalingrad?”
The Russians have moved to the Donbas, the eastern part of Ukraine, where open field fighting might give them more advantages. If you have the troops and the firepower, you are much better off in such an environment. There is no immediate result from this shift, however, and if Ukraine is given sophisticated weaponry, there might not be. Especially on the flat steppes of eastern Europe, the advantage belongs to whichever side has the better aiming technology. It will be interesting to see if the Russians, one of the earliest adopters of airborne warfare, will use their parachute troops now.
Neither Ukraine nor its friends need lose hope. Ukraine knows its enemy better than we do, and that is evident in early successes. More importantly for all of us, Russian military defeats have often culminated in massive Russian reforms and even revolutions. Finally, Putin’s behavior, like that of evil dictators before him, has warned us once again about the abuse of patriotism. Patriotism is the glue that holds a country together in crisis. But taken to extremes, it can also become not just a form of fanaticism but also a tool for suppressing opponents, destroying a free press and undermining democracy. And not just in Russia.
Hubert van Tuyll is an occasional contributor of news analysis for The Augusta Press. Reach him at hvantuyl@augusta.edu
