(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column of those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Augusta Press.)
War dominates human history. When we’re not fighting, we’re threatening to or dealing with the effects. A couple of you may be thinking that I’m about to launch into a diatribe about the Civil War, or War Between the States, or whatever you want to call it. But I’m not. (OK, I will mention it, but only briefly.)
No – today I’m talking about getting out of a war, whether during or before. And why it’s so hard. Specifically, how Russia will find its way out of the Russo-Ukrainian War.
A friend of friend is in the Ukraine. He went there voluntarily to help with humanitarian aid, and went straight to the city of Kharkiv, then in the middle of the combat zone. Recently, he messaged my friend that there are rumors that a high-level American delegation is in Moscow attempting to broker a settlement. Rumors include the idea that Ukraine will have to give up a little land.
It’s possible. The danger of the war spreading is enormous. Neither Finland nor Sweden would have applied for NATO, essentially reversing 70+ years of foreign policy, if the risk the war spreadingwas fake news. So, ending the war with an agreement would be good for everybody. But negotiating, whether to end or prevent a war, is a mighty tricky thing. I’d like to give you a few examples, and then give my explanations of why it’s so hard to get out.
We might as well start with an old favorite; the (in)famous Munich Agreement of October 1938. Simple summary: Adolf Hitler demanded that Czechoslovakia hand over a slice of territory known as the Sudetenland. The Czechs had an alliance with France. France had an alliance with Britain. But instead of going to war, the British and the French forced Czechoslovakia to hand over the Sudetenland, in return for a solemn promise from Hitler that he would leave the rest of Czechoslovakia unmolested. And he kept that promise – for six months. Then he overran the by then-defenseless country, thereby now surrounding Poland on three sides.
It is amazing how often this fiasco is cited as an argument for never giving in to a demand from an expansionist power, especially if it is led by a dictator. And obviously it failed; it did not prevent World War II. But British leader Neville Chamberlain had his reasons. The whole scenario looked too much like World War I, which had been a catastrophe. He knew that he had almost no public support for militarily opposing Hitler in 1938. His military position (as well as that of France’s) was weak for two reasons. First, in World War I, both countries had Russia as an ally. That was not possible in 1938. Russia was now Communist and therefore was also seen as a threat. Furthermore, Russia no longer even bordered on Germany – Poland lay in between now – so Russia’s possible role in the crisis was negligible. Second, the United States was less friendly than it had been before. In case of war, the British and the French would not even have been allowed to buy what they needed on the American market, let alone receive support. In other words, Chamberlain’s attitude toward the possibility of war was based on something quite simple: he thought he would lose! And despite getting off the plane and waving the agreement while stating, “I believe this is peace in our own time,” privately he thought otherwise; he immediately took steps to maximize military aircraft production.
A strange footnote to all this: years later we discovered that Hitler was not at all happy with the outcome. He had hoped for war because he thought he would win. His generals were all convinced that they would lose. Some even tried to encourage the British to take a hard line! And if Hitler fooled Chamberlain and others about his long-term intentions – he pretended he only wanted to restore the prewar Germany – many of his own generals and even some top Nazis were fooled as well.
In other words, the least successful attempt in modern history to avoid war through negotiation was a lot more complicated than was often realized. The truth is that World War II was pretty much unavoidable. Considering that it is the bloodiest war ever (so far), that is a sobering thought. Hitler was going to have his war, because he was getting older and his health was not that great. (Note: many stories contend that Mr. Putin is severely ill with cancer.) At the other end, no negotiated conclusion was possible with Nazi Germany. Either Nazism would exist, or it wouldn’t. It had to be bombed into submission. Strangely enough, though, negotiation did play some role in the fall of the other two Axis powers. Italy brilliantly negotiated its way out, accomplishing a complete change of sides in the process. Japan surrendered only after the long-desired promise that we wouldn’t hang Hirohito was given. Of course, neither country was in much of a position to resist militarily anymore.
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And there we see a glimmer of the problem of negotiating. In the case of Japan, it did not matter much to Americans whether the Japanese emperor dangled from the gallows or not. But looking at other international negotiations, the picture gets cloudy. There is always the danger that a government that negotiates will be accused of being weak. In 1794, Founding Father John Jay negotiated an excellent treaty with Britain to resolve issues and prevent another conflict, but the terms were so unpopular that Jay’s political career was ruined. Then of course, there is the question of timing. At Munich, Chamberlain thought it better to pay the price and postpone war. With hindsight, this was a mistake. It’s like the Confederate attempt to negotiate peace with the Union. In 1864, there was a real chance that Lincoln might lose the election, which would have brought a pro-negotiation Union government to power. It could have happened – but thanks to Jefferson Davis’ blundering, William T. Sherman captured Atlanta, and Lincoln was saved. Confederate peace initiatives were approved by the CSA Congress in January 1865, and they actually met Union representatives in February – but at that point, the outcome of the war was so inevitable that the Confederates had nothing to offer, and the Union desired to offer nothing.
More recently, our participation in two major wars ended mostly through negotiation. In Korea, the fighting (not the war; it never officially ended) came to halt in 1953 after three years of fighting. It was easy for the opponents to agree to a cease-fire. The Communist armies had taken up a defensive position and built fortifications that would have required atomic bombs to dislodge. The United Nations forces had achieved the original goal of the war, which was to save South Korea from communism. In other words, nobody really wanted to keep fighting. Vietnam was more complicated, but by the time that we reached an agreement with the enemy, most of our forces had already been withdrawn through a process known as Vietnamization, and the Nixon administration had no desire to continue. Support for the war was shrinking rapidly, the Pentagon could not modernize so long as its budget was underwriting operations and nobody had a clear idea of how the war could be won. (The enemy did, and they won.)
So, the record of peace negotiations is spotty. Why? After all, the human and economic costs of wars can be astronomical. I have lost count of how many times I have heard that “it is so sad that we have to send our men and women in uniform to fight halfway across the globe.” To which I have to point out that it is MUCH preferable to be able to fight your wars far away from home rather than in your own front yard. But either way, why is peace so hard to negotiate?
The bottom line: Wars develop a momentum all of their own. If it’s difficult to negotiate before a war, it’s even worse during a war. Why? Here are a few thoughts:
- The bitterness and hatred toward the enemy increases. It doesn’t matter whether this just happens naturally or whether propaganda plays a role.
- The determination to win often increases as the war progresses.
- There is a fear that offering to negotiate will sound like weakness. As a result, the offer is often made at the wrong time! One should negotiate when winning – not when you are at the end of your rope.
- Bloodshed and losses may only increase the demand that you fight on to honor those who have fallen. To consider this, I would like you to consider the words of one of the most famous wartime poems ever written. Its author was Lt.-Col. John McCrae, a medical officer with the Royal Canadian Artillery. He penned the poem in 1915, after the death of a close friend. (McCrae himself died in the war.) Read the poem and decide how he might have reacted to a call for a negotiated peace:
In Flanders Fields, the poppies blow Between the crosses, row on row, That mark our place; and in the sky The larks, still bravely singing, fly Scarce heard amid the guns below. We are the dead, short days ago We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow, Loved and were loved, and now we lie In Flanders fields. Take up our quarrel with the foe: To you from failing hands we throw The torch; be yours to hold it high. If ye break faith with us who die We shall not sleep, though poppies grow In Flanders fields.
